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RACE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW IN AMERICA:
INTRODUCTION TO THE SYMPOSIUM
ROBERT A. SEDLERt
The theme of this Symposium is the influence of race on the
development of American law. In American law we directly deal with
issues of race in terms of constitutional and statutory prohibitions
against racial discrimination. But our racial history and its consequences
have influenced the development of law in America in many other ways,
and it is that influence that is the theme of this Symposium.
In the constitutional and legal history of the United States, race
cannot be separated from slavery. Our Nation was founded on the
institution of racial slavery, and racial slavery was specifically protected
in the Constitution and American law.' In order to somehow try to
t Distinguished Professor of Law and Gibbs Chair in Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties, Wayne State University. B.A., 1956,J.D., 1959, University of Pittsburgh.
1. Six of the thirteen original states-Maryland, Delaware, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia-were slave states. At the time of the
Constitutional Convention, the existence of slavery in these states was a political
"given"and recognition of their interests as "slave states" was a part of the calculus of
interests that shaped the Constitution. As a result, at least three provisions of the
Constitution specifically recognized and protected slavery: Article I, Section 2, which
provided that slaves constituted three-fifths of a person for purposes of representation
in the United States House of Representatives; Article I, Section 9, which prohibited
Congress from abolishing the slave trade before 1808; and Article 4, Section 2, which
required the return of fugitive slaves to their owners. As Supreme Court Justice
Thurgood Marshall said at the time of the Bicentennial of the Constitution:
No doubt it will be said, when the unpleasant truth of the history of slavery
in America is mentioned during this bicentennial year, that the Constitution
was a product of its times, and embodied a compromise which, under other
circumstances, would not have been made. But the effects of the framers'
compromise have remained for generations. They arose from the
contradiction between guaranteeing liberty and justice to all, and denying
both to Negroes.
Justice Thurgood Marshall, Commentay: Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States
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justify this inhumane institution, it was necessary to brand the African
slaves as morally inferior human beings who legitimately could be
enslaved by the morally superior whites. It was in this way that the
concept of white supremacy and black inferiority found its way into
American law. Horrific as Taney's language in Dred Scott may sound to
us today, it was an accurate description of American law in 1858:
"[Negroes] had for more than a century before [the Constitution] been
regarded as beings of an inferior order.., and so far inferior that they
had no rights which the white man was bound to respect."2
The concept of white supremacy and black inferiority continued
after the abolition of slavery and the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment. It was reflected in Pesg v. Ferguson,3 which legitimated
state-imposed racial segregation and bans on interracial marriage in the
southern states.4 The state laws prohibiting interracial marriage provide
Constitution, Address Before the AnnualSeminar ofthe San Francisco Patent and Trademark Law
Assoation (May 6, 1987), in 101 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1987). Legal doctrine with
respect to slave ownership existed in all of the "slave states," and in cases presenting
issues relating to slavery, the legitimacy of slavery was assumed. See, e.g., The Antelope,
23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825) (noting that while Americans could be prosecuted for
violating federal laws against slave trading, foreigners had the right to engage in the
slave trade if the laws of their home nation permitted them to do so); Prigg v.
Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842) (holding that Congress had the power to
enact the federal Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, which established procedures for the
capture and return of fugitive slaves, and this law preempted and invalidated a
Pennsylvania law creating impediments to the recapture of fugitive slaves).
2. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1856).
3. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
4. Id. These laws, referred to as "Jim Crow" laws, were not widespread prior to
Pksy, but were adopted throughout the southern and border states following the
Supreme Court's holding in Pes~y that such laws were constitutional. See the
discussions of this point in C.VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM
CROW 98-100 (1955); Jennifer Roback, The Pok'ical Economy of Segtegation: The Care of
Segreated Streetcars, 46 J. EcON. HIST. 893 (1986). For further discussion of the
historical context of Pkssy, see MichaelJ. Kiarman, The Psay Era, 1998 SuP. CT. REV.
303; Paul Oberst, The Strange Carverof Plessy v. Ferguson, 15 ARIz. L. REV. 389 (1973).
Professor Safranek notes that following the Supreme Court's decision in Berea Colklge
v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908), holding that the state could require segregation at
completely private institutions, "states and cities passed a number of laws that
prohibited the association of Blacks and Whites in a wide variety of public facilities,
such as restaurants, hotels, restrooms, and barber shops." StephenJ. Safranek, Race and
the Law, or How the Courts and the Law Have Been Warped by Radal Injustice, 48 WAYNE L.
REV. 1025, 1047 (2002).
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an early example of how racial considerations can influence the
development of other areas of American law. It has long been settled in
the United States that a state generally will recognize a marriage of its
domiciliaries entered into in another state if the marriage is valid under
the law of the state where it is performed even though the marriage
would not be valid under its own laws. The reasons for the rule are
obvious. The question of the validity of the marriage may not arise until
many years later, and the parties, considering themselves to be married,
will have acted as married persons, including producing children, so that
undesirable social consequences could result if the marriage were
declared invalid. The exception to the rule of recognition is where a
marriage would be "contrary to the overriding public policy of the
domicile" or "in violation of its positive law."' The classic examples of
marriages "contrary to the overriding public policy of the domicile"
were polygamous marriages, certain incestuous marriages between close
relatives and "marriage between persons of different races where such
marriages are at the domicile regarded as odious."6 It was not until 1967,
it may be noted, that the Supreme Court held that laws prohibiting
interracial marriages were unconstitutional.
Professor Safranek points out that in the early twentieth century, the
Supreme Court came down with some decisions holding that particular
forms of state-imposed discrimination against African Americans were
unconstitutional.' By the 1930s, apart from constitutional challenges to
5. ROBERTA. SEDLER,ACROSS STATELINES: APPLYING THE CONFLICTOFLAWS
TO YOUR PRACTICE 178-81 (1989).
6. This formulation is found in the American Law Institute's RESTATEMENT OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 132 (1934). Professor Albert A. Ehrenzweig, writing in 1962,
noted that, "[T]he American Law Institute has seen fit to endow those states which
continue to deny legal effect to 'miscegenou? marriages with a 'paramount interest' in
such marriages of their domiciliaries that is said to entitle the laws of those states to
enforcement everywhere." A.A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICTOFLAWS 386-87 (1962). He
also pointed out that as of 1958, some twenty-four states had "preserved their
miscegenation statutes," id at 387 n.61, and correctly predicted that, "sooner or later
the Supreme Court of the United States will find occasion to remove the problem by
outlawing miscegenation statutes for both domestic and conflicts purposes." Id at 387.
7. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967). As of that late date, some sixteen states
still prohibited interracial marriage. Id at 6 & n.5. The Lovings had been married in the
District of Columbia, where interracial marriages were permitted, and moved to
Virginia. They were then prosecuted for a violation of the Virginia law prohibiting
interracial marriage. Id at 2-3.
8. See the discussion and review of cases in Safranek, supra note 4, at 1052-54.
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racial discrimination itself, considerations of race and the racial context
in which important constitutional questions were presented appeared to
influence the development of American constitutional law in what we
would now consider a more positive way.
For example, two landmark 1930s cases protecting the rights of
persons accused of crime arose as they did only because of officially
sanctioned discrimination against African Americans in the southern
states. In Powell v. Alabama,9 decided in 1932, the Supreme Court held
that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to counsel in
criminal cases was binding on the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment; ° that at least in capital cases, counsel had to be appointed
for indigent accused; and that the assistance of counsel had to be
effective." That case involved the "Scottsboro trial," where young and
illiterate African Americans were tried, convicted, and sentenced to
death without being represented by counsel after being accused of
raping white women traveling on a freight train with them in Alabama.' 2
In Brown v. Mississippi,3 decided in 1936, the Court held that the
admission into evidence of a coerced confession violated due process.'4
Three defendants, described by the Court as "all ignorant negroes,"'
were taken into custody and whipped repeatedly by white men,
including law enforcement officials, until they "confessed in every
manner of detail as demanded by those present.' 6 One of them had
been hanged from a tree twice, then taken down and whipped until he
confessed. 7 The jailers fully acknowledged the whippings, and in
response to how severely he whipped one of the victims, one jailer said:
"Not too much for a negro; not as much as I would have done if it were
left to me."' 8 As the Court stated: "It would be difficult to conceive of
methods more revolting to the sense of justice than those taken to
procure the confessions of these petitioners, and the use of the
9. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
10. Id at 67-68.
11. Id at 71.
12. Id at 49-52.
13. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
14. Id at 286.
15. Id at 281.
16. Id at 282.
17. Id at 281.
18. Id at 284.
[Vol. 48:10171020
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confessions thus obtained as the basis for conviction and sentence was
a clear denial of due process."' 9
A very important First Amendment case from this period, Herndon
v. Lowey, z° decided in 1937, also arose in a racial context. Herndon was
an African American organizer for the Communist Party who went to
Georgia to recruit members for the Party among African Americans
living in Georgia's Black Belt.21 He advocated among other things,
"equal rights for the Negroes and self-determination for the Black
Belt."'  He was convicted of insurrection, a capital offense under
Georgia law, and sentenced to a long prison term.' In very strong
language, the Court held that the First Amendment fully protected the
right to advocate fundamental social change, including the idea of
violent revolution.24 The Court also held that the First Amendment
required that a law regulating expression must be narrowly drawn so
that it would not be "a dragnet which may enmesh anyone who agitates
for a change of government if a jury can be persuaded that he ought to
have foreseen his words would have some effect in the future conduct
of others." 2
5
Another example of race influencing the development of American
law is the Supreme Court's "state action" decisions in cases from 1944
through 1964, involving claims that racial discrimination practiced
against African Americans, ostensibly by private entities, amounted to
unconstitutional state action. The racial discrimination involved in those
cases would today be prohibited by the Voting Rights Act of 1965,26 the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,27 and the Fair Housing Act of 1968.28 In these
cases the Court found unconstitutional state action in the exclusion of
African Americans from a political party's primary and pre-primary, 9 in
their exclusion from a park that had been transferred from public to
19. Id. at 286.
20. 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
21. Id at 247-53.
22. Id at 250.
23. Id. at 243-44.
24. Id at 259-61.
25. Id. at 263-64.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1973-1973gg-10 (2000).
27. 42 U.S.C. 9 2000e-2000e-17 (2000).
28. 42 U.S.C. 9§ 3601-3631 (2000).
29. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 477 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649,
664-65 (1944).
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private ownership,' in their exclusion from a privately-owned restaurant
located in a government-owned facility,3 and in their exclusion from a
privately-owned lunch counter when there was a local ordinance
requiring racial segregation in restaurants. 2 The Court also held in
Shelly v. Kramer,33 that it was unconstitutional for the state to enforce a
racially restrictive covenant in a suit by a private person.' 4 After the
passage of modem civil rights laws, fewer state action cases have
involved issues of racial discrimination." In those cases that did,
however, the Court was more likely to find unconstitutional state
action,36 while in the cases that did not, the claim of unconstitutional
30. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 302 (1966).
31. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
32. Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 248 (1963). In Lombard v. Louisiana, 373
U.S. 267 (1963), there was no ordinance, but the Court found that statements by city
officials that "sit-ins" would not be permitted had the same coercive effect as an
ordinance prohibiting them. Id. at 273-74.
33. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
34. Id at 23. It is interesting to note that three Justices did not participate in the
decision. While, as usual, no reason was given for their recusal, it may be speculated
that they recused themselves because they lived in homes that were covered by racially
restrictive covenants. And it was not until 1950, after Shelky had been decided, that the
Federal Housing Authority abandoned its official policy of issuing mortgages for
homes that were subject to racially restrictive covenants. See the discussion in Robert
Westley, Many Billons Gone: Is It Time to Reconsider the Casefor Black Reparations?, 40 B.C.
L. REV. 429, 441 (1998).
35. For a discussion of how civil rights laws prohibiting discrimination by private
persons would "remov[e] all major claims of racial discrimination from the state action
area," see Robert J. Glennon, Jr. & John E. Nowak, A Functional Ana4sis of the
Fourteenth Amendment "State Action" Requirement, 1976 SuP. CT. REv. 221,222-24.
36. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (holding that the use of race-
based peremptory challenges by a defendant in a criminal trial is unconstitutional);
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (holding that use by a
private litigant in a civil trial of peremptory challenge to exclude jurors on the basis of
race is unconstitutional state action); Gilmore v. Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974)
(holding that the city could not permit reserved use of public parks by private schools
practicing racial segregation); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (holding that
a state program that provides textbooks to all students in public and private schools
cannot include private schools practicing racial segregation); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387
U.S. 369 (1967) (holding that initiative amendment to state constitution establishing
absolute right of homeowner to refuse to sell home, which would have the effect of
invalidating state civil rights laws prohibiting discrimination in housing, is
unconstitutional state action). In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Inis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), the
Court found no unconstitutional state action where the holder of a state private club
[Vol. 48:10171022
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state action usually failed." I realize that in theory every state action case
presents a different issue, so it is possible, as I have done, to reconcile
the Court's state action decisions in consistent doctrinal terms.3
Nonetheless, as regards race and the development of law in America, I
find it noteworthy that the Court has been more likely to find
unconstitutional state action in the cases where a claim of racial
discrimination was involved than in the cases where it was not. Now
that cases involving such claims are less likely to arise, the Court has
been correspondingly less likely to find unconstitutional state action.
With this introduction, we now turn to our distinguished panel.
Professor Gerald Torres of the University of Texas and Professor
Steven Safranek of Ave Maria Law School will make presentations, and
Professor Zanita Fenton of Wayne State Law School will comment on
the presentations. We will then open the floor for your questions.
liquor license refused after-hours liquor service to a member's African-American guest.
In Evans v. Abngy, 396 U.S. 435 (1970), the Court found no unconstitutional state
action in the application of racially neutral trust law that allowed the park involved in
Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966), to revert to testator's estate when it could no
longer be operated on a racially discriminatory basis.
37. The thrust of the Court's current state action doctrine is that in order for the
action of a private entity to be state action for constitutional purposes, there must be
governmental involvement in the particular action alleged to be unconstitutional. For
cases finding no governmental involvement in the challenged action despite heavy
regulation of the private entity, see San Francisco Arts & Athktics, Inc. v. United States
Otmpic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987) (holding that a private organization supporting
United States participation in Olympic activity to which Congress granted the right to
prohibit certain uses of the word "Olympic" is not a state actor); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457
U.S. 991 (1982) (holding that a nursing home receiving state subsidy and state
payments for more than 90% of the patients is not a state actor); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,
457 U.S. 830 (1982) (holding that a private school receiving most of its operating funds
from the state to provide education for problem students that have been referred to
it by public high schools is not a state actor); Flag Bros. Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149
(1978) (holding that warehouseman's sale of goods entrusted to it for storage goods
as authorized by state law, but without assistance of public officials is not a state actor);
Jackson v. Metropohitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (declaring that public utility
holding governmental monopoly is not a state actor); Moose Lodge No. 107, 407 U.S.
163.
38. See Robert A. Sedler, The Probkm of 'State Act'on,' in AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 130-32 (Kluwer International Encyclopedia of Laws Series
2000).
